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Abstract
Whistle-blowing is usually regarded as a way to identify abuse and wrongdoing
on the part of governments and corporations. In this paper we show how, at a
micro level, whistle-blowing can be used as a designer tool to prevent opportunistic
behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of
a simple hierarchical structure.
We focus on a three layered principal-supervisor-agent structure and show how
the principal can use whistle-blowing as a way to prevent the supervisor and the
agent from colluding to the detriment of the principal.
To understand our mechanism we need to explicitly define the penalty a party
has to incur for walking away from a collusive agreement. Rewarding whistle-
blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the
side deal and report to the principal that collusion took place. This threat clearly
reduces the informed party’s incentive to participate in side deals. It also serves as
a potential blackmail threat between the colluding parties. However, careful use
of whistle-blowing allows the principal to eliminate opportunities for blackmail.
∗ This paper partially replaces a previous version entitled “Avoiding Collusion through Discretion”
(Felli and Hortala-Vallve, 2011). We are grateful to the Editor of the journal and three anonymous
referees for their insightful comments. We greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions of
Philippe Aghion, Richard Arnott, Giuseppe Bertola, Sandro Brusco, Francesca Cornelli, Donald Cox,
Mathias Dewatripont, Peter Diamond, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Franklin M. Fisher, Oliver Hart, An-
drea Ichino, Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort, John Moore, Patrick Rey, Lars Stole, Jean Tirole,
Miguel Villas-Boas, Oved Yosha and of seminar participants at numerous institutions during the ex-
ceedingly long gestation of this research project.
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Whistle-blowing is an important phenomenon both in public life and in the corporate
world. High profile whistle-blowers such as Edward Snowden for the National Security
Agency, Bradley Manning for the US Army and M.N. Vijayakumar for the Indian Ad-
ministrative Service have left a lasting and sometimes controversial impression on public
opinion about the power of whistle-blowing and its disciplinary role within public and
corporate life. In all these cases whistle-blowing is understood as the disclosure (in the
public interest) of an illegal or damaging practice to the press or other media platforms in
the name of the public interest. This usually leads to the indictment of the organization
that the whistle-blower is working for.1 In this paper we explore a very different role for
whistle-blowing. We explore how rewarding whistle-blowing can be used as a mechanism
design tool to prevent detrimental or unwanted opportunistic behavior such as collusion
or blackmail within an organization. Indeed, in the British Standards’ Whistleblow-
ing Arrangements Code of practice (2008) it is stated that ”... an organisation where
the value of open whistleblowing is recognised will be able to deter wrongdoing”. Our
findings should promote the safeguarding of whistle-blowing practises: no wrongdoing
should ever occur when public organizations rationally anticipate their own malpractises
will reach the public eye.
In the classical paper on Congress’ oversight responsibilities, McCubbins and Schwartz
(1984) argue that there is one-form of oversight that is usually overlooked precisely be-
cause of its passive role. The authors assert that Congress can police-patrol executive
agencies or can also fire-alarm oversight by establishing a set of criteria the agency
should comply with while allowing interested parties to blow the whistle when they ob-
serve any wrongdoing. In this paper we analyse in detail the interaction between both
oversight capabilities and show how Congress and ultimately the Voter (either of them
can be interpreted as the principal in our model) can design contracts so as to avoid
any wrongdoing. More specifically, we are interested in situations in which agencies (the
supervisor in our model) might be colluding with a regulated company (the agent in
1The literature on whistle-blowing is vast, see Miceli, Near, and Dworkin (2008) for a complete
overview of the recent developments in multiple disciplines on the issue.
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our model) to the detriment of the public interest.2 Agencies gather information on the
firms it regulates yet these regulated firms would sometimes prefer this information be-
ing concealed so as to avoid tighter regulation. Colluding behaviour between the agency
and the regulated firm (to the detriment of the public interest) can be avoided at no cost
by appropriately rewarding whistle-blowing (a type of fire-alarm oversight). This mech-
anism is costless to the public because anticipating the possibility of whistle-blowing
prevents collusion or blackmailing from occurring in the first place.
The possibility of collusion between supervisors and agents is a well known phe-
nomenon. For example, De La O and Martel Garcia (2015) analyze the Mexican Federal
government (our principal) oversight of municipalities with local or state auditors. These
auditors (our pupervisor) have a mandate to audit the use of federal resources in the
hands of municipal authorities (our agent). Local auditors are seen as more effective
due to their access to local information yet they are also seen more prone to political
pressures or collusive agreements.
The key idea of our model is very simple. Consider a stylized three-layered hierar-
chical structure: a principal, a supervisor and an agent. Suppose that the agent has
private information on his productive ability and the supervisor only observes an imper-
fect signal of such ability. The principal can elicit the information from the supervisor
but by doing so he introduces the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and
the agent: an agent whose ability is higher than a certain value can extract larger rents
when the principal believes he is a low type. However, to reach a collusive agreement the
agent and the supervisor need to communicate and define the terms of the agreement.
In so doing, the supervisor might become more informed about the productivity of the
agent and the principal can reward the supervisor for leaking such information. If this is
the case, the agent will refuse to participate in the collusive bargaining process to avoid
losing the informational rent promised by the principal and collusion will be prevented.
2When the Libor fixing scandal became public in 2012, there were indications that the regulators
(the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority) might not have been free of guilt in
Barclays’ behaviour. Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration was supposedly working together
with AdvaMed (an association of medical companies) on the medical device provisions in the 21st
Century Cures Act.
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In the mechanism we present, the principal transfers the informational rent from the
agent to the supervisor if the latter reports the information revealed during collusion or,
equivalently, blows the whistle and reports that collusion took place. In so doing, the
principal costlessly prevents harmful collusion.
The supervisor is able to exploit this additional information revealed during collu-
sion only if she can breach the collusion agreement even if at a cost. In what follows we
advance the existing literature by explicitly modelling the enforceability of collusion, in
particular the cost an individual incurs by breaching a collusive agreement. The prin-
cipal is then able to prevent collusion by introducing in the contract to the supervisor
a clause that compensates the supervisor for the cost incurred when breaching the col-
lusive agreement. Notice that since the final outcome is such that the agent refuses to
participate in collusion this clause never applies in equilibrium and hence collusion is
prevented at zero cost to the principal.
Allowing the supervisor to report that collusion took place, however, comes at a cost.
It creates the opportunity for the supervisor to blackmail the agent by threatening to
blow the whistle even in the absence of any collusion unless the agent pays part of his
informational rent to the supervisor. We show that whistle-blowing once again can solve
this problem. Allowing the agent to report the supervisor’s threat to the principal is
enough to prevent blackmail in equilibrium. Moreover, if rewards for whistle-blowing
are carefully chosen the agent’s option to blow the whistle does not introduce further
blackmail opportunities on the part of the agent.
Related Literature
Our analysis is closely related to the literature on collusion, pioneered by Tirole (1986).
This literature has depicted the problem as a costly one. It has modeled collusion as
a fully enforceable side contract ignoring the possibility for the principal to induce one
of the colluding parties to breach the side contract and report to the principal that
collusion took place. This implies that the opportunity of collusion comes at a cost
to the remaining parties to the contract (Tirole, 1986, Laffont and Martimort, 1997,
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Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort, 2003).
While the early literature on collusion has analyzed collusion under hard or verifiable
information,3 the more recent literature has considered collusion-proof mechanisms in
the presence of soft or unverifiable information (Laffont and Martimort 1997, 1999, 2000
and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003). The last four
papers are the closest to ours. They consider an incentive contract involving a prin-
cipal, a supervisor and an agent and allow parties to setup fully enforceable collusive
side contracts. They show that the collusion-proof principle (Laffont and Martimort,
1997) holds in this environment. The optimal mechanism is equivalent to a mechanism
that in equilibrium does not allow the parties of the contract to engage in collusion.
In other words, the optimal contract is the solution to the principal’s payoff maximiza-
tion problem, provided that supervisor and agent are not involved in collusion (as well
as the standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints). In addi-
tion, Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort (2003) show that the equivalence principle
holds, and that delegation, when interpreted as an increase in the discretionary power of
members of the organization, is a way to implement the optimal collusion-proof mecha-
nism.
The approach we present here fits into their framework, and both the collusion-proof
principle and the equivalence principle apply. In other words, the optimal mechanism
we construct is such that the agent and the supervisor do not engage in collusion and
an increase of the parties’ discretionary power is a way to implement such a mechanism.
However, as opposed to these papers, in our case the principal can always avoid collusion
at no cost. We differ from these papers in that we explicitly model the possibility of
breaching side contracts. We then allow the mechanism designer or principal to offer
a mechanism that compensates the uninformed party for breaching the side deal and
reporting the existence of the side deal to the principal.4 In other words, we enlarge the
3See for example Kofman and Lawarre´e (1993, 1996).
4In this respect our approach is similar to the augmented revelation mechanisms (Ma, Moore, and
Turnbull, 1988, Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1990) that allow a mechanism designer (the principal)
to prevent strategic coordination — as opposed to collusion — among agents. See also Demsky and
Sappington (1989) for a hierarchical model where coordination between the supervisor and the agent is
a concern that needs to be addressed by the optimal mechanism selected by the principal.
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message space of both the supervisor and the agent in the general mechanism that the
principal offers them. When collusion takes place under asymmetric information, these
enlarged message spaces serve the role of preventing any collusion and blackmail on the
equilibrium path.
A number of papers have explicitly considered the effect of delegation on parties’
incentives to engage in collusive agreements. Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998) have explored
the effect of delegation in a moral hazard setting in the presence of colluding parties’
limited liability. They identify the optimal delegation mechanism that achieves the
outcome that is optimal in the absence of collusion.5 This parallels our findings yet we
do not rely on limited liability but rather on the colluding parties’ option to breach the
side contract at a cost.
Che and Kim (2006) and Celik (2009) both analyze delegation in the presence of
collusion in a hidden information framework. Both papers ask whether delegation can
achieve the same outcome that is optimal in the absence of collusion. While Che and
Kim (2006) reach a positive answer in a very general framework, both in terms of the
technology and the number of parties involved in collusion, possibly excluding some of
the parties from the side deal, they do impose restrictions on the correlation between
the colluding parties’ information structure. Celik (2009), on the other hand, focuses
on an organizational and informational structure similar to the one we consider here.
He shows that delegation is not necessarily an optimal mechanism. In contrast to these
papers, the mechanism we suggest provides the colluding parties with the incentive to
breach the side contract and exploit the information they learn during collusion to their
advantage and to the disadvantage of the other parties. This is the reason why in our
framework increasing discretion is optimal.6
5See also Kessler (2000) for a related point.
6Quesada (2005) explicitly models the informed principal problem that may arise when collusion
takes place under asymmetric information. This occurs when the party offering the side contract has
private information not available to the other party. In our context collusion does not lead to an
informed principal situation for two competing reasons. The supervisors and the agent’s information
structures are nested: the supervisor knows less than the agent. We follow Laffont and Martimort
(1997) and model collusion in a way that is agnostic on the extensive form of the collusion game. In
other words, our results do not rely on the identity of the principal in the side contract or how the
collusive negotiation is structured.
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The literature on whistle-blowing has mainly focused on its effects on antitrust policy
and crime prevention.7 This literature has identified the optimal leniency program that
may destabilize cartels or criminal organizations by identifying the optimal amount of
leniency that destroys the trust of the repeated (cartel) relationship (Motta and Polo,
2003, Spagnolo, 2004) or the optimal rewards to employees for blowing the whistle to au-
thorities on the cartel’s existence (Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic, 2006). More recently, Ting
(2008) shows that the informational advantages of whistle-blowing might be outweighed
by the costs of employees exerting less effort. On a related paper, Beim, Hirsch, and
Kastellec (2014) show that too much whistle-blowing decreases the informativeness of
such disclosure and might yield more wrongdoing in the first place. Relatedly, Austen-
Smith and Feddersen (2009) analyse the managerial choice of whistle-blowing practises
for providing incentives to report violations and committing to fix such violations in-
ternally when they are privately reported. We build on this literature by focusing on
whistle-blowing as a mechanism design tool of the principal and explicitly addressing the
effects that rewarding whistle-blowing has on increasing the supervisor’s opportunity to
blackmail the agent.
Finally, there is a recent literature that focuses on the interplay of collusion, blackmail
and whistle-blowing. Khalil, Lawarre´e, and Yun (2010) explore the close relationship
between bribery and extortion. They show that in the presence of soft information, it is
optimal to allow bribery and extortion to occur in equilibrium even if it is feasible to deter
both. The reason for this is that in their paper the coalition incentive constraints are
interlinked. The key difference with our analysis is the use of whistle-blowing as the tool
that allows the principal to prevent both collusion and blackmail (bribery and extortion
in their terminology) at no cost.8 Leppamaki (1997, Ch. 3) also considers explicitly the
interplay of whistle-blowing and blackmail in a contractual setting. While Leppamaki
(1997, Ch. 3) analyzes blackmail in an incomplete-contract dynamic framework, in what
follows we solve for the principal’s static mechanism design problem.
7See Spagnolo (2008) for an extended survey of the effects of whistle-blowing on antitrust policy,
and Gambetta and Reuter (1995) for its effects on prosecuting organized crime.
8See also Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo (1999) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) for an analysis of
both corruption and extortion in a taxation and law enforcement setting, respectively.
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The Model
The Parties
We model a simple three-level hierarchy. The top of the hierarchy is the residual claimant
of profits: the principal (P ). The bottom layer is the only level that actually produces
any output: the agent (A). The intermediate level consists of a supervisor (S), who
is capable of collecting information about the agent’s relevant characteristics. Follow-
ing our example in the Introduction above, one could think of the principal as being
Congress; the supervisor as being a regulatory agency that gathers information on the
industry’s activities and the agent as being a regulated firm whose activities are heavily
influenced by the legislation Congress puts in place.
The agent is the productive unit of the hierarchy. He is endowed with a productivity
parameter θA, θA ∈ ΘA ≡ {θA1 , θA2 }, θA2 > θA1 . He may or may not exert a productive
effort eA ∈ R, and both effort and productivity will generate an output x according to
the following simple technology:
x = θA + eA (1)
The agent is assumed to be risk neutral in income. His utility function is linear
in income and strictly concave in effort. Disutility of effort is expressed, in monetary
terms, by d(eA), where d′(·) > 0, d′′(·) > 0, d′′′(·) > 0, for all eA > 0; d(0) = d′(0) = 0,
d(eA) = 0, for all eA < 0.9 The agent’s objective function is then: w − d(eA); his
reservation wage is w¯.
The supervisor has a monitoring role. She does not contribute directly to the produc-
tive process, but just provides information. If requested, she can supply the information
to the principal. This is modeled by assuming that the supervisor observes a noisy sig-
nal, θS ∈ ΘS ≡ {θS1 , θS2 }, θS2 > θS1 , of the agent’s productivity parameter θA. Arguably,
the agency that regulates a particular industry will never have perfect information on
9Notice that while this is a model with both moral hazard and adverse selection the technological
assumption, Equation 1 above, implies that for all intents and purposes this is a pure adverse selection
framework (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, Ch. 7). The role of negative effort is to keep things simple and
allow the high productivity agent to mimic the low productivity agent. The assumption on the third
derivative of the disutility function assures concavity of the optimization problems considered later.
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this industry’s characteristics. This signal is soft or unverifiable information, in the sense
that an outside party — the principal in particular — has no way to verify the real value
of the signal besides asking the supervisor for a report and inducing, through incentives,
truthful revelation. This signal is observed by the supervisor at no cost.10
The supervisor is risk averse. Her utility function V (s) is strictly concave in the
salary s: V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0. The supervisor has an outside option with a reservation
salary s¯.
The principal is risk neutral, and is the residual claimant of the agent’s actions.
The Information Structure
The principal is the least informed party. His information set includes only the final
levels of output x. The supervisor costlessly observes the noisy signal θS of the agent’s
productivity θA, and observes x. Finally, the agent has the best information structure:
he knows θA, and can observe both the signal θS and x.11 We take x to be the only
verifiable information of the model, while θA is observable only to the agent and θS is
observable to both the agent and the supervisor.
The agent’s productivity θA and the supervisor’s signal θS are positively, but imper-
fectly, correlated. Let:
qi = Pr{θS = θS1 | θA = θAi } i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
That is, q1 is the probability that the signal θ
S
1 is correct and q2 is the probability that
the same signal is not correct. We take θS to be a strictly but not fully informative
signal of θA:
0 < q2 <
1
2
< q1 < 1 (3)
10In principle, the supervisor might have to spend a costly effort to get a strictly informative signal,
as in Demsky and Sappington (1989). However, such generalization does not add much to the analysis
of collusion, while considerably complicating the notation and the presentation of the model.
11The fact that A observes θS is clearly a simplifying assumption. It provides us a simple framework
in which collusion may take place between the agent and the supervisor.
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The Timing and Solution Concept
Before contracting, θA and θS are determined by nature and are the agent’s and the
supervisor’s private information. As mentioned above the supervisor only observes the
realization of θS while the agent observes the realizations of both θS and θA. The
principal’s beliefs about θA and θS are then characterized by the prior pi = Pr {θA = θA1 }
and the conditional distribution qi as in Equation 2 above, while the supervisor’s beliefs,
after observing the realization of θS, are:
p1 = Pr{θA = θA1 | θS = θS1 } =
q1pi
q1pi + q2(1− pi)
p2 = Pr{θA = θA1 | θS = θS2 } =
(1− q1)pi
(1− q1)pi + (1− q2)(1− pi)
(4)
Negotiations take place in which the principal is assumed to have all the bargaining
power. He proposes a take-it-or-leave-it contractual offer C = (CA, CS) to both the agent
and the supervisor, which specifies a schedule of compensations for them contingent on
output and on the supervisor’s report.
Supervisor and agent simultaneously and independently decide whether to accept or
reject the principal’s offer. If the agent rejects the offer, negotiation with both parties
ends and the game ends. If the supervisor rejects the offer, negotiation proceeds involving
only the agent. The game then becomes a standard two tier principal-agent problem.12
If the principal wishes, he can make degenerate offers to the supervisor, which amount
to a decision on his part to negotiate only with the agent. If both supervisor and agent
accept the offer a contract is signed.
After the contract is signed, the collusive negotiation between the supervisor and the
agent takes place. We provide below a general characterization of this negotiation.
At a predetermined time — between the initial contracting date and the date at
which the agent produces output x — the supervisor produces a report r of her observed
signal that becomes public information.13 The agent then exerts his productive effort,
12Alternatively, the principal could make a unique offer to the agent that specifies a contractual
arrangement, if the supervisor accepts the principal’s offer and a different arrangement if the supervisor
rejects the principal’s offer; nothing would change.
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the outcome of production becomes publicly observable and remunerations are paid
according to the contract C.14 We assume that all of this structure – summarized in the
figure below – is common knowledge to all the parties.
-s s s s sA learns θA
S and A
learn θS Contract
Collusion
between
S and A S reports r s
A chooses eA
Output produced
Transfers
A world without collusion or blackmail
The Revelation Principle implies that, without loss of generality, we can restrict atten-
tion to a revelation game where both agent and supervisor reveal their information to the
Principal, who can then use this information subject to the usual incentive constraints.
These incentives constraints require that the agent and supervisor reveal their informa-
tion truthfully given the contracts offered by the Principal (that is the remunerations
and the effort level of the agent).15 In the revelation game the supervisor’s strategy
space is the set of all possible mappings from the signal space ΘS into her message space
ΘS. Similarly, the agent’s strategy space is the set of all possible mappings from the
space of the productivity parameters ΘA into the message space ΘA. The mechanism
the Principal offers specifies a salary for the supervisor, a wage for the agent and an
13In principle, it might be of use for the principal to ask the agent, as well as the supervisor, to report
the signal θS . This cannot improve the Principal’s utility given that under our optimal mechanism
collusion will be avoided at zero cost.
14We take the timing of the supervisor’s report as exogenously given. This is a simplifying assumption.
However, our main result — the fact that collusion can be prevented at no additional costs — suggests
a reason why the principal might want to specify the timing we analyze. See Felli (1990, Chapter 2,
Section 6) for a discussion of the case in which the timing of the supervisor’s report is endogenous.
15See Chapter 7 of Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a detailed discussion on how in our case the
adverse selection and moral hazard problem simplifies to a pure adverse selection problem using the
revelation principle.
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output as functions of the agent’s and supervisor’s reports:
C = [s(θˆA, θˆS), w(θˆA, θˆS), x(θˆA, θˆS)]
If only the agent accepts the principal’s contract offer then the mechanism boils down
to a standard principal agent problem.16
In what follows we focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this game
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991): a Principal contract (remunerations and effort level in
each state of the world), a revelation mapping for both the agent and the supervisor (a
mapping from their private information to the message revealed to the Principal) and a
belief system by the Principal such that all strategies are sequentially rational given the
belief system and the belief system is consistent, wherever possible, given the strategy
profile.
When there is no scope for collusion, both agent and supervisor are honest in the
sense that neither of them engage in collusion or blackmail, our simple structure allows
the risk neutral principal to pay a constant salary to the risk averse supervisor
s(θˆSi , θˆ
A
j ) = s¯ ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2} (5)
and induce her to report the truth.17
The principal inherits, in this way, the information of the supervisor and can sign a
contract with the agent that induces him to report the truth. This incentive contract
is contingent on the information θˆS that the supervisor reports as well as the agent’s
report θˆA. The principal optimization problem is then subject to the agent’s incentive
16In this case the optimal mechanism is [w(θˆA), x(θˆA)].
17We assume thorough the analysis that in case of indifference each party behaves in the best possible
way for the principal. This tie-breaking rule is used to avoid multiple equilibria in the subgame played
by the supervisor and the agent that arises when both parties are indifferent between their actions. The
same result could be obtained by augmenting the honest mechanism described in this section, as in Ma,
Moore, and Turnbull (1988), using nuisance strategies that allow the principal to induce the supervisor
and the agent to coordinate on the equilibrium that the principal desires.
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and participation constraints:
max
{xij ,wij}
pi [q1 (x11 − w11) + (1− q1) (x12 − w12)]
+ (1− pi) [q2 (x21 − w21) + (1− q2) (x22 − w22)]
s.t. w2j − d(x2j − θA2 ) ≥ w1j − d(x1j − θA2 ) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}
w1j − d(x1j − θA1 ) ≥ w¯ ∀j ∈ {1, 2}
(6)
where xij = x(θˆ
A
i , θˆ
S
j ) and wij = w(θˆ
A
i , θˆ
S
j ) for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every j ∈ {1, 2}.
Problem 6 is standard. The principal’s expected profit is maximized subject to the
incentive compatibility constraints for the high productivity agent and the individual
rationality constraints for the low productivity agent. We omit individual rationality
constraint for the high productivity agent and incentive compatibility constraint for
the low productivity agent since, as easily shown, these constraints are not binding in
equilibrium.
From Problem 6 we obtain:
x21 = x22 = x2 > x11 > x12 (7)
w21 − d(x2 − θA2 ) > w22 − d(x2 − θA2 ) > w¯ (8)
w11 − d(x11 − θA1 ) = w12 − d(x12 − θA1 ) = w¯ (9)
w21 − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w11 − d(x11 − θA2 ) (10)
w22 − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w12 − d(x12 − θA2 ) (11)
These conditions, together with Equation 5, fully characterize what we here label the
optimal honest contract.
The following Proposition 1 highlights the key feature of the honest contract relevant
for our analysis of collusion.18
Proposition 1 The premium paid in equilibrium to the high productivity agent is higher
if the supervisor reports θˆS1 rather than θˆ
S
2 : w21 > w22.
18For ease of exposition all proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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The intuition behind this result is simple. The principal’s costs of inducing a high
productivity agent to separate himself from a low productivity agent are of two types:
a premium, in utility terms, for the high productivity agent and an inefficient effort
(output) level that the low productivity agent is required to produce.19 Whenever the
supervisor tells the principal that she thinks the agent has low productivity — that is she
has observed a low signal θS1 — the principal updates his prior distribution increasing the
probability that the agent has a low productivity θA1 . This increases, in expected terms,
the costs of having the low productivity agent produce an inefficient level of output, while
reducing, in expected terms, the costs of a premium for the high productivity agent. Of
course, the situation is symmetric and opposite whenever the supervisor reports to the
principal a high signal θS2 . Therefore, the principal, in equilibrium, trades-off these two
costs and offers a higher premium to the high productivity agent, if the supervisor’s
report is low, than if it is high — Proposition 1 and Equation 8 — and requires the low
productivity agent to exert a higher effort, if the supervisor’s report is low, than if it is
high — Equation 7.
A final question is whether in this world a principal would want to hire a supervisor
in the first place. The answer depends on the reservation salary of the supervisor s¯. If
the constant salary paid to the supervisor does not exceed the principal’s gains generated
by the availability of the signal θS the principal strictly prefers to hire a supervisor.20
19Inefficiency is defined here with respect to an hypothetical first best, obtained in the case the
principal observes perfectly the productivity or the effort of the agent.
20 The proof that an additional strictly informative signal generates a positive gain to the principal
goes as follows. The standard two tier principal-agent optimization problem can always be written
in the form of Problem 6 adding the two constraints xih = xik, ∀h 6= k, h, k ∈ {1, 2}. These two
constraints turn out to be binding at the optimum. Equation 7 shows that this is not true whenever
the information reported by the supervisor is available. Thus, the principal is strictly better off in the
latter case.
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The Possibility of Collusion
The Collusive Contract
In our setup collusion takes place between two asymmetrically informed parties: the
agent and the supervisor. Therefore, in principle it is possible that during the collusion
negotiation the uninformed party, the supervisor, learns the private information of the
informed party, the agent. Depending on the extensive form of the collusion negotiation
this revelation of information might occur before the uninformed party commits to the
collusive agreement or after this occurs. The implications of this timing differ depending
on how enforceable the collusion agreement is: whether the uninformed party can walk
away from collusion and what penalties for breach she is required to pay if she does. In
modeling collusion we want to specify a general model that encompasses this additional
source of information for the supervisor and allows her to walk away from the collusive
agreement, possibly at a cost.
The key assumption of our model is that negotiation of the collusive contract takes
place between asymmetrically informed parties. This typically leads to multiple equilib-
ria. What matters for our analysis is whether these equilibria separate the two types of
agent during the collusion subgame. Indeed, all separating equilibria reveal the type of
the agent to the supervisor hence the information of the supervisor improves.
In what follows we do not specify an extensive form for the collusion negotiation
game.21 Instead we follow Laffont and Martimort (1997) and assume the existence of a
collusion designer. The colluding parties report their private information to the collusion
designer. In our setup only the informed party, the agent, reports his private information,
we denote this report θ˜Aj , j ∈ {1, 2}. The designer then assigns to the colluding parties
an allocation of surplus through the transfer that the agent makes to the supervisor
β(θ˜Aj ), j ∈ {1, 2}, a given report θˆS(θ˜Aj ), j ∈ {1, 2}, that the supervisor makes to the
principal and a report θˆA(θ˜Aj ), j ∈ {1, 2} that the agent makes to the principal depending
on the agent’s report θ˜Aj to the collusion designer. By the revelation principle, without
21See Felli (1990, Ch. 1) for a closely related model where collusion negotiation proceed according a
specific extensive form: a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the agent to the supervisor.
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loss of generality we can restrict attention to equilibria of the collusion subgame where
the agent reports the truth to the collusion designer, θ˜Aj = θ
A
j : reports are incentive
compatible. If equilibrium transfers are such that β(θA1 ) 6= β(θA2 ) then the equilibrium
of the collusion game is a separating one and the supervisor learns the agent’s private
information in the collusion subgame. Finally, collusion is a voluntary agreement, hence
both parties will agree to participate in the collusion contract only if the allocation
induced by the collusive agreement is individually rational. In our environment this
implies that the allocation induced by the collusion game has to be strictly better than
the allocation induced by the contracts offered by the principal if the parties decide not
to participate in collusion.22
The enforceability of a side contract between two parties is an open issue in the
literature on collusion. Often a long term relationship or a reputational argument is
mentioned, in the background, to justify the enforceability of a side contract.23 In our
analysis we use a different approach. We assume there is an exogenously given penalty
for breach, denoted κ (κ ≥ 0), that a party to collusion has to pay to walk out of the
collusive agreement. We also assume that a percentage α (α ∈ [0, 1]), of this penalty
is received by the counterpart in the collusive agreement. In other words, in the case
of breach of the collusive agreement the payoff to the party breaching the side deal
decreases by the amount κ while the payoff to the other party of the deal increases by
the amount ακ.
The existing literature has overlooked the principal’s ability to prevent collusion by
inducing parties to breach their collusive agreement. The difference between the penalty
to the party breaching the collusion contract κ and the transfer to the other party ακ
is meant to capture the fact that most of the cost associated with breaching a side deal
is associated with a loss of reputation and future opportunities. This implies that the
cost cannot be easily transferred to one’s counterpart in collusion. In other words, our
general specification encompasses the situation in which only the supervisor incurs a loss
22Recall our (standard) assumption that when indifferent the agent or the supervisor behaves in the
way the principal wants them to behave. In other words, if indifferent neither party participates in
collusion.
23See Aghion and Caillaud (1988) for a paper that explicitly analyzes this long term relationship.
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when breaching the collusive contract (α = 0). Alternatively, our setup is also robust to
considering situations in which the supervisor can walk away from the collusive contract
just before it is signed (that is the cost for breaching the collusive contract is nil, κ = 0).
The optimal mechanism we derive below works independently of the size of κ, this
is meant to capture the fact that the loss in reputation associated with the breach may
well exceed the financial benefits of the side deal. However, we need the precise value
of κ to be common knowledge to all parties. If the principal is not perfectly informed
of the nature of the collusive contract and of the penalties associated with its breach
a further level of complexity is added to the corresponding mechanism design problem.
We leave the analysis of this setting to further research while noting that in our setting
it would be sufficient that the principal knows the upper bound of κ for all of our results
to hold true.
Strongly Collusion Proof Contracts
As mentioned above, in our setting collusive negotiation takes place between asymmet-
rically informed parties. This implies that in general the equilibrium outcome of the
collusive game is not unique. Hence, the principal’s objectives when facing the collusion
problem are not at all obvious.
A possible objective might be for the principal to offer a contract to the supervisor
and the agent such that when they get involved in the collusion game there exists at
least one equilibrium of such a game in which no collusive agreement is enforced. We use
a stronger notion of collusion-proofness similar to the one used in the existing literature:
Definition 1 A contract is strongly collusion-proof if there are no equilibria where a
collusive agreement is reached and the equilibrium allocation coincides with the one that
arises when both the agent and the supervisor are honest.
This definition is very restrictive as it requires that there are no equilibria where
supervisor and agent collude. Notice that in our setting this restrictive notion comes
without loss of generality as we will be able to costlessly avoid collusion.
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Collusion when the Principal offers the honest contract
We begin by observing that the optimal honest contract presented in the previous section
is not strongly collusion-proof. In other words, if the principal offers such a contract to
both the supervisor and the agent, Inequality 8 implies that in the event θS = θS2 the
high productivity agent is willing to pay at most
b = w21 − w22 > 0 (12)
to the supervisor for her to report θˆS1 while from Equation 9 the low productivity agent
is not willing to pay any positive amount to the supervisor for the same report. In
the event θS = θS1 , instead, neither type of agent is willing to pay any amount to the
supervisor for changing her report.
In other words, there exists a whole set of equilibria for the collusion game between
the supervisor and the agent in which the supervisor observes the signal θS2 , and the
high productivity agent pays a positive bribe to the supervisor to induce him to report
a low signal. These equilibria differ depending on the size of the transfer that the high
productivity agent pays to the supervisor.
Lemma 1 The honest contract is not strongly-collusion proof. Under the honest con-
tract, when the supervisor observes the signal θS2 , there only exist separating equilibria
of the collusion game such that: the high productivity agent pays a positive bribe to
the supervisor, β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b), the supervisor reports θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 while the agent reports
θˆA(θA2 ) = θ
A
2 . The collusion designer prescribes β(θ
A
1 ) = 0, θˆ
S(θA1 ) = θˆ
S
2 and θˆ
A(θA1 ) = θ
A
1
for the low productivity agent that does not participate in collusion.
This result shows that the supervisor and the agent may successfully engage in collu-
sion when the honest contract is offered to them. A critical feature of Lemma 1 above is
that all the equilibria of the collusion game are separating equilibria: β(θA2 ) > β(θ
A
1 ) = 0.
In other words, the high productivity agent reveals his type by participating in collusion
and making a positive transfer to the supervisor while the low productivity agent does
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not. This implies that, in spite of the asymmetry of information that characterizes the
collusive negotiation, the supervisor, by observing the agent’s willingness to participate
in collusion, learns the exact value of the productivity of the agent. In other words, the
existence of collusion is synonymous with the agent having high productivity.
The Collusion-Proof Optimal Mechanism
In this section we propose a mechanism which allows the principal to prevent collusion
between the supervisor and the agent in a costless way: in this mechanism the principal
allows the supervisor to blow the whistle by reporting that a collusion agreement has
been reached. This report is associated with a premium that the principal pays the
supervisor that covers the penalty the supervisor has to pay for breaching the collusive
agreement. We now show that such a promise does not involve any extra cost for the
principal: it is never carried out in equilibrium. If the high productivity agent observes
this clause of the employment contract of the supervisor, he never agrees to participate
in collusion as by doing so he loses the informational rent that he otherwise would have
gained.
Candidate Strongly Collusion-Proof Contract
When the honest contract is in place, the supervisor may observe two different signals
of the agent’s productivity: the standard signal θS ∈ ΘS and the information possibly
leaked during the collusion game. The latter takes the form of the agent’s truthful report
in the collusion game, which, under the honest contract, fully reveals the productivity
of the agent.
It is critical for the construction of the collusion-proof contract to enlarge the message
space of the supervisor. This should allow her to report to the principal that the agent
has high productivity with certainty once she sees the agent’s optimal strategy in the
collusion game: ΘS ∪{`A2 }, where `A2 denotes the leaked information during the collusive
game (in equilibrium this will be interpreted as the agent having high productivity).
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As with every other message, `A2 is soft or unverifiable information so it is possible that
`A2 6= θA2 . The message space of the agent is for the moment left unmodified.
We now specify the part of the strongly collusion-proof candidate contract that con-
cerns the employment contract of the agent. If the supervisor reports any of the messages
in ΘS and the agent reports any of the messages in ΘA the agent’s payoffs are, as in the
honest contract, characterized by the solution to Problem 6. If the supervisor reports
the new message `A2 , and the agent reports θˆ
A
2 we assume that the agent is asked to
produce output x2, defined in Equation 7, and is paid a wage w˜ so that:
w˜ = w¯ − κ+ d(x2 − θA2 ) (13)
where w¯ is the reservation utility, κ the penalty the supervisor pays to breach the
collusive agreement, and d(x2 − θA2 ) is his disutility of effort.
The same remuneration w˜ applies to the agent if the supervisor reports `A2 and the
agent reports θˆA1 . Also in this case the agent is asked to produce output x2.
We now specify the collusion-proof candidate contract between the principal and the
supervisor.
If the supervisor reports any of the signals in ΘS she is paid her constant reservation
wage s¯, as in Equation 5, whatever the agent’s strategy choice.
If the supervisor reports the message `A2 and the agent reports θˆ
A
2 the supervisor gets
her reservation salary plus a premium equal to the penalty κ which she has to pay to
breach the collusive agreement and report `A2 to the principal:
s(`A2 , θˆ
A
2 ) = s¯+ κ, (14)
Finally, if the supervisor reports `A2 and the agent, reports θˆ
A
1 the supervisor receives
her reservation salary minus a positive punishment γ.
s(`A2 , θˆ
A
1 ) = s¯− γ, γ > 0 (15)
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We impose a constraint on the size of the punishment γ so as to prevent the supervisor
from reporting `A2 if the agent does not engage in collusion.
p2 V (s¯− γ) + (1− p2)V (s¯+ κ) = V (s¯) (16)
Condition 16 implies that after observing the signal θS1
p1 V (s¯− γ) + (1− p1)V (s¯+ κ) < V (s¯) (17)
HHHHHHHH
A’s report
S’s report
θˆA1 θˆ
A
2
`A2
θˆS1
θˆS2
CP S = [ s¯− γ ]
CPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CP S = [ s¯+ κ ]
CPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CP S = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w11, x11 ]
CP S = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w21, x21 ]
CP S = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w12, x12 ]
CP S = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w22, x22 ]
Table1: Collusion-Proof Contract.
Table 1 above summarizes the description of the candidate collusion-proof contract CP .
Finally, recall that if we interpret the supervisor’s message `A2 as informing the prin-
cipal that collusion occurred then `A2 is equivalent to the supervisor blowing the whistle
on the existence of collusion.
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Preventing Collusion
We can now show that the collusion agreement we presented in Lemma 1 above cannot
occur in any equilibrium of the supervisor and agent subgame under the collusion-proof
contract.
Proposition 2 Assume that the principal offers the collusion-proof contract to both the
supervisor and the agent and that they both observe the signal θS2 . There exists no
equilibrium collusive agreement such that the supervisor, after observing the signal θS2 ,
reports θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆ
S
1 while the θ
A
2 agent makes a transfer β(θ
A
2 ) ∈ (0, b) and reports
θˆA(θA2 ) = θ
A
2 .
The main intuition behind this result is as follows. Recall first that according to
Lemma 1 all collusive agreements between the supervisor and the agent under the honest
contract entail separating equilibria and hence the supervisor learns the true type of the
agent.24 Moreover, the collusion-proof contract specifies payments to both the supervisor
and the agent that coincide with the honest contract whenever the supervisor reports
θˆS ∈ {θS1 , θS2 }. However, the collusion-proof contract also offers the supervisor that
engaged in collusion the option to breach the collusive agreement at no cost if the
supervisor is certain that the agent is high productivity and reports `A2 to the principal.
In the latter case the supervisor payoff is s¯ + β(θA2 ) which coincides with her payoff if
she goes along with collusion.25 The result is that the supervisor is always compensated
for breaching the collusion agreement contract. She is thus indifferent and reports `A2 to
the principal. According to the collusion-proof contract the high productivity agent is
then strictly better off by not engaging in collusion.
24There exist only separating equilibria of the collusion game under the honest contract because,
in equilibrium, the low productivity agent is indifferent whatever the report of the supervisor: the
individual rationality constraint of the this type of agent is binding — see Condition 9 and Lemma
1 above. It follows that the low productivity agent is not willing to pay any amount to change such
report. Notice that this is a rather general characteristic of a model where collusion takes place among
asymmetrically informed parties.
25The supervisor payoff is derived under the assumption that in the collusive contract the bribe β(θA2 )
is paid upfront and is not refundable. Notice however that ακ, what the agent receives in the event of
a breach of the collusive contract on the part of the supervisor, may well exceed the bribe paid upfront
and hence be regarded as a refund of this bribe in the event of a breach.
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The key observation is that in our framework all equilibria of the collusion game
between the supervisor and the agent reveal the exact productivity of the agent to
the supervisor. Hence, in equilibrium the supervisor has the discretionary power to
report this leaked information to the principal which in turn discourages the agent
from participating in collusion. Clearly, the same mechanism would not be successful
in preventing pooling collusive agreements if these exist. Costly resources would then
be needed to get rid of the pooling equilibria of the collusion game — that is using a
mechanism a` la Laffont and Martimort (1997).26
Notice that the existence of any level of asymmetric information is enough for whistle-
blowing to be successful in eliminating ”some” collusion. Indeed, CP prevents collusive
agreement from arising in equilibrium whatever the precision of the signal θS2 with the
exception of the limit case q1 = 1, that is when the supervisor is perfectly informed after
observing a high signal. The following result identifies the situations in which our result
on collusion-proofness holds.
Corollary 1 No equilibrium collusive agreement, as in Lemma 1, exists for any imper-
fect signal θS2 observed by the supervisor: (1− p2) < 1.
This result implies that the costs of preventing collusion are discontinuous in the
limit as the noise associated with the signal observed by the supervisor vanishes. When
the supervisor’s signal is perfect, preventing collusion becomes costly for the principal
as in Laffont and Martimort (1997). The supervisor and the agent collude only when
the supervisor perfectly observes the productivity of the agent. Allowing the supervisor
to blow the whistle, is then of no use to the principal.
It is worth observing that whistle-blowing allows the principal to prevent collusion
in a costless way when the signal θS1 is a perfect signal: when q2 converges to zero, or
equivalently p1 converges to one. Collusion occurs only when both the supervisor and the
agent observe the signal θS2 , which is not a perfect signal: the probability that the agent
26Notice that similar considerations also apply when the supervisor has hard information as in Tirole
(1986). Indeed, in this case collusion only occurs between symmetrically informed parties, hence costly
resources need to be used to prevent collusion arising in equilibrium.
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has low productivity is not null, p2 > 0.
27 This implies that the collusion game can still
reveal some information to the supervisor. Therefore allowing the supervisor to blow
the whistle is still effective in preventing collusion agreements between the supervisor
and the agent at no additional costs for the principal (Proposition 2 applies).
A final observation concerns the willingness of the principal to use a supervisor.
Since the solution to the collusion problem we propose is costless for the principal, the
same considerations we presented above apply in this case. There exist values of the
reservation salary of the supervisor for which the principal has a strictly positive gain
by hiring her.
Blackmail
The Blackmail Threat
A different type of manipulation may occur when the principal offers the collusion-proof
contract. This takes the form of blackmail. Blackmail is a unilateral threat by one of
the parties involved. For blackmail to occur in equilibrium we require the threat to be
credible. In other words, an equilibrium of our model with blackmail is a PBE where the
blackmailing party asks for a transfer µ > 0 from the blackmailed party. If the transfer is
made then the blackmailing party complies with the equilibrium strategy in the absence
of blackmail. If the blackmailed party refuses to make the transfer the blackmailing
party behaves consistently with his/her threat.
In what follows we show that allowing the supervisor to report the information leaked
during the collusion game to the principal provides the supervisor with the opportunity
to abuse his authority and threaten the agent to report `A2 , even in the absence of any
27Notice that if θS1 is a perfect signal, collusion between the supervisor and the agent will take a
slightly different form even when the honest contract is offered. In fact, in such a case there will be no
need for the principal to specify a payoff for the high productivity agent if the supervisor reports θˆS1 :
the signal is perfect, so, provided the supervisor reports the truth, the agent’s productivity is certainly
low. However, it is still profitable for the high productivity agent to bribe the supervisor to report signal
θˆS1 when θ
S
2 is observed but this report requires the agent to report θˆ
A
1 or, equivalently, to produce a
low output. Indeed, the premium the high productivity agent receives in this way is greater than the
informational rent he would get if the supervisor reports the truth.
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collusion, unless she receives a payment µ on the part of the agent.
Assume that the principal offers the collusion-proof contract to both the supervisor
and the agent and they both accept. As from Proposition 2, whatever the signal θSi , the
agent refuses to participate in any collusive agreement with the supervisor. Assume now
that, before reporting its observed signal, the supervisor threaten the agent to report
the signal `A2 unless she receives a strictly positive payment µ > 0. We show below that
there exist values of µ that render this blackmail a credible threat on the part of the
supervisor.
Notice first that since no collusion took place, following this threat, if both types
of agent behave in the same way, the supervisor is still uninformed on the value of the
agent’s type θAi . Therefore, Equations 16 and 17 guarantee that under contract CP if
both types of agent refuse or accept to pay µ the supervisor reports θSi rather than `
A
2 .
In other words the blackmail threat is not credible.
This means that blackmail can be credible only if the two types of agent make
different choices when deciding whether or not to succumb to blackmail. We, then, need
to consider each type of agent’s willingness to go along with the supervisor’s blackmail
threat.
Consider first the θA2 agent. His maximum willingness to pay to avoid the supervisor
reporting the message `A2 is given by the difference between his payoff if the supervisor
reports the signal θSi and his payoff when she reports `
A
2 . This difference is
WA2 = κ+ d(x1i − θA1 )− d(x1i − θA2 ) (18)
Consider now the θA1 agent. His maximum willingness to pay is instead
WA1 = κ+ d(x2 − θA1 )− d(x2 − θA2 ) (19)
It then follows from the convexity of the disutility of effort, d′′(·) > 0, and x2 > x1i that
the θA1 agent is willing to pay strictly more than the θ
A
2 agent to avoid the supervisor
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reporting `A2 rather than θ
S
i .
WA1 >WA2 (20)
This implies that the only blackmail payment µ that separates the two types of agent is
one that is acceptable to the θA1 agent but not acceptable to a θ
A
2 agent:
WA1 > µ >WA2 (21)
Any other value of µ is either acceptable to both types of agent or not acceptable to
either type.
Notice now that if the supervisor blackmails the agent by asking for a transfer µ
satisfying the Inequalities 21 above, the supervisor following the agent decision to pay
or not µ discovers the type of the agent. In particular, following the agent’s decision not
to pay µ, the supervisor knows that the agent is of type θA2 . It is then optimal for the
supervisor to report `A2 since in so doing she gets payoff s¯ + κ rather than the payoff s¯
she gets from reporting θSi . On the other hand, following the agent’s decision to pay µ
the supervisor knows that the agent is of type θA1 . It is then optimal for the superior to
report the signal θSi since in so doing she gets from the principal s¯ instead of s¯ − γ as
from the collusion-proof contract. In other words, the supervisor’s blackmail threat is
credible.
Lemma 2 The contract CP is vulnerable to blackmail. Under contract CP there exists
a set of equilibria such that if both types of agent and the supervisor accept the collusion-
proof contract the supervisor credibly threaten the agent to report `A2 unless a transfer
µ > 0 satisfying the Inequalities 21, is paid by the agent to the supervisor. QED
As in the case of collusion, the reason why the supervisor’s blackmail is credible
is that if blackmail occurs it separates the two types of agents and, as a consequence,
the supervisor discovers the type of the agent and finds it optimal to behave differently
depending on whether the agent accepts or not to pay the transfer µ.
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Preventing Collusion and Blackmail
We propose here a mechanism that prevents both collusion and blackmail. Similarly
to the collusion-proof contract, this mechanism now also allows the agent to blow the
whistle by enlarging his message space and allowing him to report whether he received
a blackmail threat from the supervisor. We denote the latter message B. We first define
what it means for a contract to be blackmail-proof.
Definition 2 A contract is blackmail-proof if all PBE of the model are such that no
party can credibly threaten any other party to deviate from the prescribed equilibrium
behavior in the absence of blackmail in exchange for a transfer µ > 0.28
We propose a new contract, collusion and blackmail proof (denoted CBP ), that
allows the principal to prevent, costlessly, both collusion and blackmail. This contract
enlarges the message space of both the supervisor and the agent by allowing both to
blow the whistle. It not only allows the supervisor to report the message `A2 if collusion
occurs, but also allows the agent to report to the principal that blackmail occurred,
message B, and in so doing triggers a penalty for the supervisor that discourages her
from blackmailing the agent.
Following the supervisor’s report `A2 , we allow the agent to report either his type θˆ
A
i
or the additional message B. Notice that we restrict the agent to report the additional
message B only after the supervisor’s report of the leaked information `A2 in order to
prevent additional opportunities for manipulation of the optimal mechanism on the part
of both the supervisor and the agent.
In case the agent reports B the supervisor’s remuneration is s¯ − ε, where ε > 0 is
an arbitrary small number, while the agent is asked to produce output x2, defined in
Equation 7 above, and is paid a wage w˜ defined in Equation 13. In other words, the
agent is indifferent between reporting any of the messages in (θˆA1 , θˆ
A
2 ) and B while the
28Recall that in our model we assume that when indifferent, a party complies with the strategy
desired by the principal, hence blackmail is not credible if, in the subgame following the blackmailed
party decision to not pay µ, the blackmailing party is indifferent to complying or not with the blackmail
threat.
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supervisor, if she does not know the type of the agent, is strictly worse off when the
agent reports B. We summarize the contract CBP in Table 2 below.
HHHHHHHH
A’s report
S’s report
θˆA1 θˆ
A
2
`A2
θˆS1
θˆS2
CBP S = [ s¯− γ ]
CBPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CBP S = [ s¯+ κ ]
CBPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CBP S = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w11, x11 ]
CBP S = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w21, x21 ]
CBP S = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w12, x12 ]
CBP S = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w22, x22 ]
B
CBP S = [ s¯− ε ]
CBPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
Table 2: Collusion and Blackmail-Proof Contract CBP .
We are now in a position to show that if the principal offers contract CBP to both the
supervisor and the agent and this contract is accepted, no collusion or blackmail takes
place and the outcome coincides, on the equilibrium path, with the honest contract
above.
Proposition 3 The contract CBP is strongly collusion-proof and it is not liable for
any form of blackmail either on the part of the superior or the agent. The PBE of the
continuation game between the supervisor and the agent coincides with the PBE of the
corresponding continuation game under the honest contract (Proposition 1).
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Intuitively, allowing both the Supervisor and the Agent to blow the whistle makes
the supervisor strictly worse off by blackmailing the agent (her payoff is s¯ − ε) rather
than not engaging in any threat (her payoff is s¯) because the agent is indifferent between
any report and will thus report B. In the Appendix we also show that the message B
does not introduce new opportunities for both the supervisor or the agent to engage in
collusion. It also prevent the agent from blackmailing the supervisor with the additional
message B.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have showed that potential collusion between the intermediate and
bottom layers of a hierarchy might make it desirable for the principal to allow his sub-
ordinates to blow the whistle. In other words, the principal, allowing the supervisor to
blow the whistle on whether collusion occurred, aligns the objectives of the supervisor
with her own and eliminates the opportunity of collusive behavior between layers and,
ultimately, enhances efficiency. However, allowing the supervisor to blow the whistle
introduces the opportunity for the supervisor to blackmail the agent. Once again, al-
lowing this time the agent to blow the whistle on the existence of blackmail prevents
any wrongdoing and replicates the honest outcome.
At the core of our argument is the idea that in many collusive agreements or blackmail
interactions some information is shared between collusive parties and this information
can subsequently be used to the detriment of the collusive parties or the blackmailer. In
such circumstances the principal (residual claimant in our setting) could appropriately
reward the leaking of such information and in this manner avoid collusive agreements
and blackmail threats.
In principle, one could apply this same logic to the contract the principal writes with
the agent. Indeed, the direct mechanism we have analyzed specifies that the agent and
supervisor report their private information to the principal and only at a later stage can
the agent exert her productive effort. In principle, one could argue that the principal
could use the information revealed by the agent and renege on the promised output-
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contingent remuneration before output is realized. Notice however, that this multistage
performance on the part of the agent only applies to the direct revelation mechanism.
The most obvious indirect mechanism would have the agent, after the supervisor’s report,
exert a productive effort that leads to the observed output. In other words, the agent’s
private information is only revealed when production is completed. Assuming that the
principal can renege on a promise at this stage would be equivalent to assuming that
simple trade cannot be enforced. This lack of commitment clearly opens up further
sources of inefficiency in usual contracting environments that are beyond the scope of
this paper. We should add, that it is sensible to assume that contracts written by the
principal can be enforced by a Court of Law while the same cannot be said of side
contracts. Our paper should then be read as a first step in the direction of explicitly
allowing contracting parties to breach their signed agreements.
Finally, our analysis sheds light on the use of rules versus discretion in the designing
of the optimal degree of decision power of members of an organization. Tirole (1986)
argues that fixed rules as opposed to discretion might be used to reduce patterns of
collusive behavior in large (private or public) organizations. In this paper we show that
whenever collusion takes place in conditions of asymmetric information, an increase in
the discretionary power (the message space) of intermediate layers of the organization as
emphasised in McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), may have a beneficial effect in reducing
the possibility of both collusion and blackmail.
The results presented in this paper can be interpreted as a way to implement a
particular outcome that enlarges the strategy space of subordinates. The basic intuition
is as follows.29 We have learned from the literature on commitment that under certain
conditions a player can increase his welfare whilst restricting, in a credible way, his
choices: his strategy space.30 This paper complements this literature by showing that
enlarging the strategy space of members of an organization (i.e. delegating oversight
activities to them) enhances the welfare of the residual claimant of an activity whilst
reducing the welfare of his subordinate.
29We are indebted to David Canning for this intuition.
30See for example Laffont and Tirole (1988).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that the honest contract binds the principal, the su-
pervisor and the agent. Assume that S observes the signal θS2 . The collusion contracts
C = {β(θA1 ), β(θA2 ); θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 , θˆS(θA1 ) = θˆS2 }, such that β(θA1 ) = 0, β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b) —
with b as in Equation 12 — and S reports θˆS1 if the agent reports θ
A
2 to the collusion
designer and θˆS2 if the agent reports θ
A
1 to the collusion designer, satisfies the collusion-
game incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints for the θA2 agent but
does not satisfy the collusion-game individual rationality constraint for the θA1 agent.
Consider first the collusion game incentive compatibility constraint for the θA2 agent
w21−β(θA2 )− d(x2− θA2 ) ≥ w12−β(θA1 )− d(x12− θA2 ) = w22−β(θA1 )− d(x2− θA2 ) (22)
Equations 8, 12, together with 0 < β(θA2 ) < b and β(θ
A
1 ) = 0 imply that Condition 22
holds with a strict inequality.31 Consider now the collusion-game individual rationality
constraint for the θA2 agent:
w21 − β(θA2 )− d(x2 − θA2 ) ≥ w22 − d(x2 − θA2 ) (23)
Equations 8, 12 together with 0 < β(θA2 ) < b imply that Condition 23 also holds with a
strict inequality. The collusion-game individual rationality constraint for the θA1 agent
is instead:
w12 − β(θA1 )− d(x12 − θA1 ) ≥ w12 − d(x12 − θA1 ) (24)
From β(θA1 ) = 0 it follows that Condition 24 holds with equality. This means that the
θA1 agent does not participate in the collusion game since, when indifferent, the agent
does what the principal would like him to do.32
Consider now the supervisor’s collusion-game individual rationality constraint asso-
31Notice that Equation 11 and β(θA1 ) = 0 imply that, following the deviation of the θ
A
2 agent in the
report to the collusion designer, this agent will be indifferent when making his report to the principal
and hence will report the truth.
32Notice that a similar argument shows that neither the θA1 agent nor the θ
A
2 participate in collusion
if the contract C is such that β(θA2 ) = b.
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ciated with the collusion contract C. This is:
ν V (s¯) + (1− ν)V (s¯+ β(θA2 )) ≥ V (s¯) (25)
where ν denotes the supervisor’s beliefs at the collusion stage that the type of the agent
is θA1 . Clearly, if ν < 1 and β(θ
A
2 ) > 0 Constraint 25 is satisfied with a strict inequality.
In other words, under the honest contract it is an equilibrium of the collusion game for
both the type θA2 agent and the supervisor to accept any of the collusion contracts C.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that the supervisor observes the signal θS2 . Consider
any incentive compatible collusive contract such that the supervisor reports θS(θA2 ) = θˆ
S
1
and the θA2 agent pays the bribe β(θ
A
2 ) ∈ (0, b), as in Equation 12. We proceed in four
steps.
Step 1 The agent always reports the truth to the principal whatever his productivity and
the outcome of the collusion game.
We start from the high productivity agent. Assume that the θA2 agent participates in
collusion and the collusion contract is not breached by the supervisor this agent’s payoff
is then either w21−β(θA2 )−d(x2−θA2 ), if he reports the truth, or w11−β(θA2 )−d(x11−θA2 ), if
he does not. Equation 10 implies that the agent is indifferent between these two payoffs,
hence he reports the truth. Assume next that the θA2 agent participates in collusion and
the collusion contract is breached by the supervisor who reports the message `A2 . This
agent’s payoff is then w˜ − β(θA2 ) + ακ− d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯ − β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ whether he
reports the truth or he does not. Hence, the agent, being indifferent, reports the truth.
Assume now that the θA2 agent does not participate in collusion. If the supervisor
reports the observed signal θS2 , the binding incentive compatibility constraint for the high
productivity agent, Equation 11, implies that the agent reports the truth. If instead the
supervisor reports the additional signal `A2 the agent’s payoff is w˜− d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯− κ
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whether he reports the truth or he does not. Hence, the high productivity agent is
indifferent and reports the truth.
Consider, now, the low productivity agent. Assume that the θA1 agent participates
in collusion and the supervisor does not breach the collusive agreement and reports the
signal θˆS1 , the agent’s payoff is w¯−β(θA1 ) if he reports θˆA1 and w21−β(θA1 )−d(x2−θA1 ) <
w¯−β(θA1 ) if he reports θˆA2 . Hence the agent will report the truth. Conversely, assume that
the θA1 agent does not participate in collusion and the supervisor reports the observed
signal θˆS2 . The incentive compatibility constraint for the low productivity agent —
implied by θA2 > θ
A
1 and Equation 11 — holds with strict inequality, hence the agent
reports the truth.
Finally, assume the supervisor reports the message `A2 , the agent’s payoff is the same
whatever his report. It is either w˜− β(θA1 ) + ακ− d(x2− θA1 ) = w¯− β(θA1 )− (1− α)κ+
d(x2−θA2 )−d(x2−θA1 ), if the supervisor participated in collusion, breaches the collusion
contract and reports the message `A2 or is w˜−d(x2−θA1 ) = w¯−κ+d(x2−θA2 )−d(x2−θA1 )
if she reports the message `A2 without participating in collusion. Either case, the agent,
being indifferent, reports the truth.
Step 2 Derivation of the supervisor’s best response when the supervisor observes θS2 .
As above, denote ν the supervisor’s belief that the agent is of type θA1 at the collusion
stage. Assume, first, that both the agent and the supervisor accept to participate
in collusion. The supervisor’s payoff is then V (s¯ + β(θA2 )) if she complies with the
collusion contract and reports θS(θA2 ) = θˆ
S
1 . The supervisor expected payoff is instead
νV (s¯ + β(θA2 ) − γ − κ) + (1 − ν)V (s¯ + β(θA2 )) if she breaches the collusion contract
and reports the additional signal `A2 . Equation 14 implies that if ν > 0 the former
option yields a higher payoff to the supervisor, hence she will comply with the collusion
contract. If, instead, ν = 0 the supervisor is indifferent between the two options, hence
she acts in the way most preferred by the principal: she breaches the collusion contract
and reports the signal `A2 to the principal.
Consider now the supervisor decision whether to participate in the collusion game. As
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seen above her payoff, whether she breaches the collusion contract or not, is V (s¯+β(θA2 ))
while her payoff is V (s¯) if she refuses to participate in the collusion game and reports
the observed signal θˆS2 . Clearly, if β(θ
A
2 ) > 0 the supervisor is better off accepting to
participate in collusion. Only if β(θA2 ) = 0 the supervisor is indifferent and refuses to
participate in the collusion game.
Step 3 The value of the supervisor’s belief ν = 0 is the only one consistent with the low
productivity agent’s behavior.
Assume ν > 0 and consider the behavior of the low productivity agent. Given the
supervisor’s best response (Step 2) the agent’s payoff is either w¯−β(θA1 ), if he participates
in the collusion game, or w¯, if he does not. Clearly the low productivity agent always
refuses to participate in the collusive for β(θA1 ) ≥ 0. This contradicts the hypothesis
ν > 0.
Step 4 The agent always refuses to participate in the collusion game whatever his pro-
ductivity.
We start from the low productivity agent. Given Step 2 and 3, the agent’s payoff is
w˜ + ακ− d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − (1− α)κ+ d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θA1 ) if he participates in the
collusion game and produces output x2. Such payoff is strictly lower than the agent’s
reservation wage w¯ since θA1 < θ
A
2 . Conversely, if the agent refuses to participate in the
collusion game his payoff is w¯, by Equation 9. Hence, the low productivity agent refuses
to participate in the collusion game.
Finally, consider the high productivity agent. Steps 1, 2 and 3 imply that if he accepts
the collusive offer his payoff is w˜ − β(θA2 ) + ακ − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯ − β(θA2 ) − (1 − α)κ.
Conversely, if he rejects the collusive offer his payoff is w22 − d(x22 − θA2 ) which, by
Equation 8, is strictly greater than w¯− β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ. Hence, the high productivity
agent refuses to participate in the collusion game. QED
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Proof of Corollary 1: The proof follows immediately from the observation that the
proof of Proposition 2 does not rely on how precise the signal θS2 is of the agent being
of type θA2 but only on whether, having observed signal θ
S
2 there still exists a residual,
strictly positive, probability that the agent is of type θA1 . QED
Proposition 3 will be proved with the assistance of the following four lemmas:
Lemma 3 The contract CBP is such that, in the absence of collusion, any blackmail
threat on the part of S is not credible.
Proof: Assume S threatens A to report `A2 unless she receives a transfer µ > 0 from
A. Notice, first, that following S’s report `2A, A is indifferent and hence by assumption
he reports B to P .
Assume now that while the type θA1 of A pays µ > 0 type θ
A
2 of A does not. Following
A’s decision not to pay, S’s payoff is V (s¯− ε) if S reports `A2 and V (s¯) if S reports θSi .
Therefore, S reports θSi and hence S’s threat is not credible.
Assume now that while the type θA1 of A does not pay µ > 0 type θ
A
2 of A does.
Following A’s decision not to pay, S’s payoff is V (s¯ − ε) if S reports `A2 and V (s¯) if S
reports θSi . Once again, S reports θ
S
i and hence S’s threat is not credible.
Assume now that both types of A pay µ > 0. Following type θA2 of A’s deviation:
not to pay, S’s payoff is V (s¯− ε) if S reports `A2 and V (s¯) if S reports θSi whatever S’s
beliefs. Once again, S reports θSi and hence S’s threat is not credible.
Finally, consider the case where both types of A do not pay µ > 0. S’s payoff is
V (s¯− ε) if S reports `A2 and V (s¯) if S reports θSi . In other words, S reports θSi and S’s
threat is not credible. QED
Lemma 4 The contract CBP is such that, in the absence of collusion, any blackmail
threat on the part of A is not credible.
Proof: Assume that, in the absence of any threat on the part of S, A threatens S to
report B following S’s report `A2 unless he receives a transfer η > 0 from S.
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Consider first the case in which the type θA1 of A threatens S while the type θ
A
2 of
A does not. Following A’s threat, S updates her beliefs that A is of type θA1 . S’s payoff
if she reports θSi is V (s¯) if S does not pay and V (s¯ − η) if she pays. S’s payoff if she
reports `A2 depends on A’s report. Notice, however, that A’s payoff is the same whatever
his report. In particular, A’s payoff is w˜− d(x2− θA1 ) = w¯− κ+ d(x2− θA2 )− d(x2− θA1 )
if S does not pay and w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) + η = w¯ − κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ) + η if S
pays. In either case, A is indifferent among his messages and hence reports the truth
θA1 . Given this report S’s payoff is then V (s¯− γ) if she does not pay and V (s¯− γ− η) if
she pays. This implies that S’s optimal strategy is not to pay η and to report θSi while
A’s optimal strategy is to report θA1 . In other words, A’s threat is not credible.
Consider next the case in which the type θA1 of A does not threaten S while the type
θA2 of A does. Following A’s threat, S updates her beliefs that A is of type θ
A
2 . S’s payoff
if she reports θSi is V (s¯) if S does not pay and V (s¯ − η) if she pays. Once again S’s
payoff if she reports `A2 depends on A’s report. Notice, however, that as above A’s payoff
is the same whatever his report. In particular, A’s payoff is w˜ − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯ − κ
if S does not pay and w˜ − d(x2 − θA2 ) + η = w¯ − κ + η if S pays. In either case, A is
indifferent among his messages and hence reports the truth θA2 . Given this report S’s
payoff is then V (s¯ + κ) if she does not pay and V (s¯ + κ − η) if she pays. This implies
that S’s optimal strategy is not to pay η and to report `A2 while A’s optimal strategy is
to report θA2 . Once again, A’s threat is not credible.
Finally, consider the case in which both types of A threaten S. Following A’s threat,
S does not update her beliefs. Now S’s payoff if she reports θSi is V (s¯) if S does not pay
and V (s¯− η) if she pays. Once again S’s payoff if she reports `A2 depends on A’s report.
Notice, however, that as above A’s payoff is the same whatever his report. In particular,
type θAj , j ∈ {1, 2}, of A’s payoff is w˜ − d(x2 − θAj ) = w¯ − κ + d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θAj )
if S does not pay and w˜ − d(x2 − θAj ) + η = w¯ − κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θAj ) + η if S
pays. In either case, A is indifferent among his messages and hence reports the truth θAj .
Given this report by Conditions 16 and 17 S’s payoff is smaller than V (s¯) if she does
not pay and smaller than V (s¯ − η) if she pays. This implies that S’s optimal strategy
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is not to pay η and to report θSi while A’s optimal strategy is to report θ
A
j . Once again,
A’s threat is not credible. QED
Lemma 5 The contract CBP is such that, if the supervisor observes the signal θS2 ,
there exists no equilibrium collusive agreement such that the supervisor, after observing
the signal θS2 , reports the message θ
S(θA2 ) = θˆ
S
1 and the θ
A
2 agent makes a transfer
β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b), as from Equation 12.
Proof: Assume the supervisor observes the signal θS2 . We proceed in four steps.
Step 1 The agent always reports the truth to the principal whatever his productivity and
the outcome of the collusion game.
We start from the high productivity agent. Assume that the θA2 agent participates in
collusion and the collusion contract is not breached by the supervisor this agent’s payoff
is then either w21−β(θA2 )−d(x2−θA2 ), if he reports the truth, or w11−β(θA2 )−d(x11−θA2 ), if
he does not. Equation 10 implies that the agent is indifferent between these two payoffs,
hence he reports the truth. Assume next that the θA2 agent participates in collusion and
the collusion contract is breached by the supervisor who reports the message `A2 . This
agent’s payoff is then w¯− β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ whether he reports θˆA2 , θˆA2 or B. Hence, the
agent, being indifferent, reports the truth.
Assume now that the θA2 agent does not participate in collusion. If the supervisor
reports the observed signal θS2 , the binding incentive compatibility constraint for the high
productivity agent, Equation 11, implies that the agent reports the truth. If instead the
supervisor reports the additional signal `A2 the agent’s payoff is w¯−κ whether he reports
θˆA2 , θˆ
A
2 or B. Once again, the high productivity agent being indifferent reports the truth.
Consider, now, the low productivity agent. Assume that the θA1 agent participates
in collusion and the supervisor does not breach the collusive agreement and reports the
signal θˆS1 , the agent’s payoff is w¯−β(θA1 ) if he reports θˆA1 and w21−β(θA1 )−d(x2−θA1 ) <
w¯−β(θA1 ) if he reports θˆA2 . Hence the agent will report the truth. Conversely, assume that
the θA1 agent does not participate in collusion and the supervisor reports the observed
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signal θˆS2 . The incentive compatibility constraint for the low productivity agent —
implied by θA2 > θ
A
1 and Equation 11 — holds with strict inequality, hence the agent
reports the truth. Finally, assume the supervisor reports the additional signal `A2 , the
agent’s payoff is the same whether he reports θˆA2 , θˆ
A
2 or B. It is either w˜ − β(θA1 ) +
ακ − d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − β(θA1 ) − (1 − α)κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ), if the supervisor
participated in collusion, breaches the collusion contract and reports the message `A2 or
is w˜−d(x2−θA1 ) = w¯−κ+d(x2−θA2 )−d(x2−θA1 ) if she reports the message `A2 without
participating in collusion. Either case, the agent, being indifferent, reports the truth.
Step 2 Derivation of the supervisor’s best response when the supervisor observes θS2 and
does not blackmail the agent.
Once again, denote ν the supervisor’s belief that the agent is of type θA1 at the collu-
sion stage. Assume, first, that both the agent and the supervisor accept to participate
in collusion. The supervisor’s payoff is then V (s¯ + β(θA2 )) if she complies with the col-
lusion contract and reports θS(θA2 ) = θˆ
S
1 . The supervisor expected payoff is instead
νV (s¯+ β(θA2 )− γ − κ) + (1− ν)V (s¯+ β(θA2 )) if she breaches the collusion contract and
reports the additional signal `A2 . Equation 14 implies that if ν > 0 the former option
yields a higher payoff to the supervisor, hence she will comply with the collusion con-
tract. If, instead, ν = 0 the supervisor is indifferent between the two options, hence she
acts in the way most preferred by the principal: she breaches the collusion contract and
reports the signal `A2 to the principal.
Consider now the supervisor decision whether to participate in the collusion game. As
seen above her payoff, whether she breaches the collusion contract or not, is V (s¯+β(θA2 ))
while her payoff is V (s¯) if she refuses to participate in the collusion game and reports
the observed signal θˆS2 . Clearly, if β(θ
A
2 ) > 0 the supervisor is better off accepting to
participate in collusion. Only if β(θA2 ) = 0 the supervisor is indifferent and refuses to
participate in the collusion game.
Step 3 If collusion occurs the value of the supervisor’s belief ν = 0 is the only one
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consistent with the low productivity agent’s behavior.
Assume ν > 0 and consider the behavior of the low productivity agent. Given the
supervisor’s best response (Step 2) the agent’s payoff is either w¯−β(θA1 ), if he participates
in the collusion game, or w¯, if he does not. Clearly the low productivity agent always
refuses to participate in the collusive for β(θA1 ) ≥ 0. This contradicts the hypothesis
ν > 0.
Step 4 The agent always refuses to participate in the collusion game whatever his pro-
ductivity.
We start from the low productivity agent. Given Step 2 and 3, the agent’s payoff is
w˜ + ακ− d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − (1− α)κ+ d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θA1 ) if he participates in the
collusion game and produces output x2. Such payoff is strictly lower than the agent’s
reservation wage w¯ since θA1 < θ
A
2 . Conversely, if the agent refuses to participate in the
collusion game his payoff is w¯, by Equation 9. Hence, the low productivity agent refuses
to participate in the collusion game.
Finally, consider the high productivity agent. Steps 1, 2 and 3 imply that if he accepts
the collusive offer his payoff is w˜ − β(θA2 ) + ακ − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯ − β(θA2 ) − (1 − α)κ.
Conversely, if he rejects the collusive offer his payoff is w22 − d(x22 − θA2 ) which, by
Equation 8, is strictly greater than w¯− β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ. Hence, the high productivity
agent refuses to participate in the collusion game. QED
Lemma 6 The contract CBP is such that there exists no equilibrium collusive agree-
ment where:
(i) The supervisor reports the message θˆS(θA1 ) = θˆ
S(θA2 ) = `
A
2 , the agent reports
θˆA(θA1 ) = θˆ
A(θA2 ) = θˆ
A
2 and the supervisor pays the bribe ξ ∈ (0, κ) to the agent.
(ii) The supervisor reports the message θˆS(θA2 ) = `
A
2 , the θ
A
2 agent reports θˆ
A(θA2 ) =
θA2 and the supervisor pays the bribe ξ ∈ (0, κ) to this type of agent. The θA1 agent does
not participate in collusion.
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Proof: Consider first the collusive agreement described in (i) above: θˆS(θA1 ) = θˆ
S(θA2 ) =
`A2 , θˆ
A(θA1 ) = θˆ
A(θA2 ) = θˆ
A
2 and the supervisor pays the bribe ξ ∈ (0, κ) to the agent. The
θA1 agent’s highest payoff (ξ = κ) if he participates in collusion is w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) + κ =
w¯ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ) < w¯. Hence, the θA1 agent does not participate in such a
collusion agreement since he can guarantee himself a payoff of w¯ by doing so.
Consider now the collusive agreement described in (ii) above: θˆS(θA2 ) = `
A
2 , θˆ
A(θA2 ) =
θA2 , the supervisor pays the bribe ξ ∈ (0, κ) to the θA2 agent and the θA1 agent does
not participate in collusion. The θA2 agent’s highest payoff (ξ = κ) if he participates in
collusion is w˜− d(x2− θA1 ) +κ = w¯. This implies that the θA2 agent does not participate
in such a collusion agreement since he can guarantee himself the same payoff of w¯ by
doing so. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: Notice that given contract CBP there only exist gains-
from-trade from collusion in two separate instances. When S observes θS2 the type θ
A
2
of A is willing to pay up to b as in Condition 12 above for S to report θˆS1 rather than
θˆS2 . When S reports message `
A
2 she is willing to pay up to the amount κ for the agent
to report θˆA2 rather than θˆ
A
1 or B.33
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 show that neither type of collusion may occur in any equi-
librium of our model under contract CBP . In the absence of collusion, Lemma 3 and 4
show that under contract CBP no blackmail on the part of the agent or of the supervisor
will occur in equilibrium. It then follows that, under contract CBP , all the PBE of the
continuation game between the supervisor and the agent coincides with the PBE of the
corresponding continuation game under the honest contract. QED
33In the latter case S is willing to pay more: κ+ ε.
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